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Understanding the Use of  Forecasting Software: an Interpretive 





A study of short-term forecasting in UK supply chain companies has revealed that 
some companies make limited use of the facilities that are available in the statistical 
forecasting software that they have purchased. Despite their costs, the software 
packages are often used for little more than data display. Management judgment is the 
predominant, or even exclusive, element in the derivation of the forecasts. An in-
depth interpretive study was conducted in one company to investigate the reasons for 
this. The interpretive approach focuses on the way people make sense of the world, 
both individually and through social interaction. Observations were made of the 
company’s forecasting process and semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
participants. An analysis of the information gathered, using actor-network theory, 
indicated  that  the purchase, and subsequent under use  of the software  resulted from 
the alignment of the perceived  interests of the software vendors, senior and middle 
management and other participants in the forecasting process.  The software’s primary 
role was to act as a focus for discussion with its statistical aspects subservient. The 
case demonstrates how stable but dysfunctional patterns of software usage can persist 
due to the resilience of an Actor-Network. 
 
Key Words 
Actor-Network Theory; Forecasting; Decision Support Systems; Expert Judgment; 







Consider the following situation. Several years ago a cost-conscious supply-chain 
based company in the UK, which prides itself on its application of modern 
management methods, paid out around £30,000 for forecasting software  (the latest 
version of the software cost over £100K in 2005). The  software consists of a data 
base and query language, various statistical forecasting algorithms, graphical facilities 
and an interactive component which  permits the user to adjust the statistical forecast 
that the software has initially generated. .Software packages like this are promoted by 
vendors largely on the basis of the accuracy of their in-built statistical methods. Yet, 
when the software is actually used by the managers in the company, they may 
override the statistical forecasts it produces to obtain  forecasts that ‘look right’. They 
then often go on to further adjust this ‘statistical’ forecast for ‘market intelligence’. 
This leads to a ‘final forecast’ that is then used elsewhere in the supply chain 
operation. In essence, the statistical power of the package is hardly used and the 
resulting final forecasts are based almost entirely on management judgment. 
Effectively, the expensive software is employed as a second rate data display device 
to show recent past demand history  -second rate, because the length of history that 
can be displayed is severely restricted  and the   flexibility, and clarity of the  
graphical representations of data is less than that of standard spreadsheet packages. 
Despite this, the managers perceive that they are making extensive use of the package. 
 
The decision of the managers to purchase and then use the software in this way 
appears to be questionable and it is in conflict with recommended best practice 
summarized, for example, in Sanders and Ritzman (2001). Yet it is probably 
reasonable to assume that, individually, the managers are behaving rationally 
according to their own perspectives, beliefs and motives (Kanter, 1977). Uncovering 
these is unlikely to be achieved through a ‘traditional’ survey device like a postal 
questionnaire, though to date this approach has been the predominant method for 
investigating forecasting practices in companies (e.g. Dalrymple, 1987; Klassen and 
Flores, 2001; Mady, 2000; Sanders and Manrodt, 1994). The questions posed in these 
questionnaires have  been based on the researchers’ own assumptions about the world, 
uninformed by internal experience of the companies responding and the perceptions 
of their staff. Moreover, the use of  postal questionnaires did not permit the 
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researchers to observe the environment within which the software was used or to 
probe beyond the initial responses to the questions. 
 
To try to explain the situation we need a  research methodology that reveals a deep 
understanding of reasons for the managers’ behavior and of the social and 
organizational context in which they operate. This suggests an interpretive approach 
(Walsham, 1995,  Nandhakumar and Jones, 1997; Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). 
Interpretive research methods focus on the way that people make sense of the world, 
individually and through social interaction. Reality is viewed as something 
determined by people, not as an external objective phenomenon. The aim of 
interpretive research is therefore to understand the different constructions and 
meanings which people attach to their experiences  -in this  case their experiences of  
using a forecasting system.   
 
One interpretive approach that has achieved some prominence in information systems 
research is based on actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1987; Callon, 1991; 
Akrich, 1992; Vidgen and McMaster, 1996; Walsham and Sahay, 1999). In this paper 
we use the perspective afforded by ANT to identify the interactions between the key 
actors in the forecasting process and to show how this process is aligned with the 
interests of these actors. The insights revealed through ANT enabled us to develop an 
extensive explanation for the persistence of a process that most forecasting 
researchers would regard as being far from optimal. This explanation may have 
important implications for those seeking to influence forecasting practise in 
commercial organisations. 
 
Although we have observed similar behaviour to that described at the start of this 
paper in several companies, in common with many other interpretive studies we 
decided to focus on one company - a leading UK pharmaceutical company. There are 
a number of advantages to this approach (Walsham, 1995). It allows a situation to be 
studied in depth and, as Alexander (2004) argues, the social unit can be studied as a 
whole. Further, unlike quantitative research, which depends on large samples and 
statistical inference, explanations of phenomena are supported by logical inference, 
and they are validated through theoretical and practical dialogue. 
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The research involved visits to the company’s headquarters by two or three 
researchers. The initial visit included a presentation by the company’s managers, 
followed by a general question and answer session. The researchers also observed two 
meetings where the forecasts were finalised and conducted semi-structured interviews 
with the main participants in the forecasting process: two Logistics Managers,  a 
Product Manager, a Marketing Manager, a Finance Manager, the placement student 
who was acting as  a Commercial Manager and a[stock ] Replenishment  Planner. 
Independent sets of notes were taken by each of the researchers at all meetings and 
interviews, which were also tape recorded. The research team sent a summary of their 
understanding of the organisation and its forecasting process to the company for 
validation and any necessary corrections. In addition, members of the team attended 
two user conferences run by the company which produced the forecasting software 
and also interviewed two of their software developers. . Note that, while our  approach 
is predominantly interpretive, we have also had access to statistical evidence and  
have used this  to triangulate and strengthen our findings (Nardulli, 1978). This 
consisted of a sample of 3264 forecasts that were supplied by the company and for 
which the actual outcomes were known. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We first indicate why we chose actor-
network theory to try to gain insights into the reasons underlying the origins and 
continued existence of the company’s forecasting  process  The next section describes 
the company, its decision to purchase the forecasting software and the way in which 
the software is currently being used. Statistical evidence is used to present  an 
additional perspective of the efficacy of aspects of the company’s forecasting process. 
Finally, we present our conclusions, and reflect on the strengths and limitations of our 
approach together with the business and organisational implications. 
 
Methodological Aspects 
Our beliefs and preconceptions as researchers 
 
Before describing the company’s forecasting process it is important to declare our 
own beliefs and inevitable preconceptions as researchers  Such a declaration is 
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accepted as being good practice in interpretive research, particularly given our direct 
interaction with the forecasters (Klein and Myers, 1999).  
 
Our belief, based on extensive research, is that, in general, the optimum approach to 
forecasting is to allow appropriate statistical forecasting methods to identify regular 
patterns in data (assuming that sufficient data is available for this purpose) (Goodwin, 
2002).  Failure to do this can lead to forecasters reading false patterns into the noise 
that appears in time series (O’Connor et al, 1993). Judgmental adjustments should 
only be applied to statistical forecasts when the forecaster has important information 
about forthcoming events that is not available to the statistical method. (Sanders and 
Ritzman, 2001; Fildes et al. forthcoming).  Further, the size of these adjustments 
should be accounted for and their rationale recorded (Goodwin, 2002) and they 
should, in general, be true adjustments to statistical forecasts –accounting only for the 
extra information- rather than replacements of these forecasts (Goodwin and Fildes, 
1999). Finally, any choice of method, or any decision on what length of series history 
to employ should be informed, as far as possible, by empirical evidence. 
 
As we will show, the forecasting process employed by this company deviated 
significantly from this ‘normative’ approach; the core question we address is why this 
was this was the case and whether  their adopted practices incurred unnecessary costs 
in conflict with their expressed objectives.  Our preconception at the start of the study 
was that situations like this, where the organisational process differed substantially 
from the normative, could partially be remedied through software design and 
appropriate training of company staff.  Such software would meet the requirements of 
the company by containing appropriate statistical methods, together with support 
mechanisms to aid judgmental interventions such as extensive on-line guidance. 
Furthermore,  these facilities would be provided in such a way that they would be 
accepted by users  because of their ease of use, demonstrable effectiveness (results 
demonstrability)  and other attributes, as suggested by Venkatesh and Davis’s (2000)  
technology acceptance model  (TAM2).    
 
Our observations at the pharmaceutical company caused us to question our 
preconceptions and to search for a rich explanation of how its forecasting process had 
arisen and endured. Actor–network theory helped to provide this explanation. 
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A theoretical framework  
 
A number of researchers have proposed models that attempt to explain the use of 
technology in organisations. (see Orlikowski,1992, for a critical review of some of 
these models). The models vary in the relative importance that they place on the role 
of humans and technology in influencing each other and in shaping working practices. 
For example, at one extreme, the technological imperative model (e.g., Siegel et al, 
1986) implies that technology is an exogenous influence on human behaviour and 
organisational attributes. This view discounts the actions of humans in developing, 
appropriating and changing technology and assumes that people operate and behave 
like machines. Under this assumption, ‘people compliantly carry out the orders and 
commands they receive, making efficient and effective use of all information and all 
technologies available to them’ (Davis et al, 1992). This can be contrasted with 
models which adopt  a ‘strategic choice’ perspective and  presume that technology is 
not an exogenous force but instead is itself shaped by humans operating within the 
organisations where it is deployed (e.g. Davis and Taylor, 1986. , Zuboff, 1988). 
 
Actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1987, Callon, 1991, Akrich, 1992,) avoids the 
dichotomy between human and non-human entities by using the concept of an actor 
(or actant). An actor is any element which has the power to initiate action and can be 
either a human, a collection of humans or an item such as a heavy hotel key (which 
causes a guest to return it to reception) or a computer program. Actors all have 
interests and they try to enrol other actors in order to create an alignment of the other 
actors' interests with their own.  The result of successful enrolment is an actor 
network. This network relates, not to the static relationships between the actors, but to 
the processes in which they are involved (Zackariasson and Wilson, 2004).  
 
Three key concepts associated with ANT are inscription, translation and 
irreversibility. When a technical artefact is created by an actor certain functions are 
inscribed into it which are designed to protect the actor’s interests. This process of 
inscribing involves the designer anticipating how future actors might use the artefact. 
In this process, designers define actors with ‘specific tastes, competencies, motives, 
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aspirations, political prejudices and the rest..’ (Akrich, 1992). Translation refers to the 
process of  ‘re-interpreting, re-presenting or appropriating other actors’ interests to 
one’s own’ (Callon, 1991). 
 
The inscription of an artefact is an embodiment of the translation. However, users will 
also translate the system in relation to the tasks they are performing and the context 
within which they are operating (Hanseth, 2000). Once inscribed the technology itself 
becomes an actor by influencing its users to follow its program of action. There is, 
however, no guarantee that users will follow the prescribed pattern of use and the 
technology may be deployed in ways not anticipated by the designer. The likelihood 
of deviation from these anticipated patterns depends upon the strength of the 
inscription.  For example an inscription for a software package may take the form of a 
training course, but if this proved to be too weak, stronger forms could be employed 
such as manuals or restrictiveness within the program itself (Hanseth, 2000).  The 
strength of inscriptions is a related to the irreversibility of the actor-network.  
Irreversibility is the degree to which it is subsequently impossible to return to a point 
where alternative possibilities exist (Walsham, 1997). Actor-networks with high 
irreversibility have accumulated a resistance to change so it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, for alternative translations to be made.  
 
ANT has been applied in a number of information systems research projects. For 
example, Vidgen and McMaster (1996) used it to examine an automated  car parking 
system,  Zackariasson and Wilson (2004)  used it  understand the role of IT in  an 
after-sales organisation while Hanseth and Braa (2000) looked at the role of SAP in 
influencing change in a company. However, ANT’s symmetrical treatment of humans 
and non-humans is not without its critics.   While Hanseth and Braa described  the 
technology they studied as ‘a powerful actor.. and an ally’ others argue that 
distinctions between humans and  non-humans are necessary. For example, Jones and 
Rose (2005) argue that ‘humans and machines can both be understood to demonstrate 
agency, in the sense of performing actions that have consequences, but the character 
of that agency  should not be understood to be equivalent. Human agents have 
purposes and forms of awareness that machines do not’. 
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Despite these criticisms, ANT would appear to have a number of features that have 
the potential to illuminate the forecasting process at the pharmaceutical company. Its 
symmetry means that it will not downplay the role of technologies such as the 
forecasting package in the formation and continued existence of the process. 
Moreover, because it focuses on specific actors,  it arguably allows a more fine 
grained assessment than approaches such as Orlikowski’s (1992) structurational 
model which specifies three ‘general’ components: humans, institutional properties 
and technology. It also considers the mutual interaction of all of these actors, while 
for example Orlikowski’s model only specifies four interactions.  Finally, it guides 
one towards an assessment of the interests of the actors involved, and how these might 
be aligned and also helps to explain how these alliances allow processes to endure. 
 




The organization1 we studied is a pharmaceutical sales and marketing company. 
supplying products for treating both animals and humans. Within the company there 
are three logistics managers who produce the initial forecasts for around 350 stock 
keep units (SKUs) and manage the inventory. The forecasting process also involves 
fifteen product managers, who look after the sales of groups of products, and financial 
and marketing managers. At the time of the study a placement student had also been 
recruited and he was spending a year using the package to produce forecasts for 
products with ‘well behaved’ demand patterns. 
 
Three years before our study, the company had adopted the Six Sigma approach to 
managing2. Two logistics managers had achieved ‘green belt’ status, while another 
manager was in the process of becoming a ‘black belt’. This indicates that they had 
achieved a proficiency in the application of statistical tools to management problems, 
although they had no training in statistical forecasting methods and minimal training 
                                                 
1  Aspects of this organisation have been disguised for reasons of confidentiality, both organisational 
and personal. 
2 Six Sigma is a data driven method for eliminating defects  in any process – including those used in 
manufacturing and service industries 
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in the use of the package (the manual had been lost a long time ago). One of the Six 
Sigma projects that coincided with our study concerned the company’s forecasting 
process. 
 
Forecasting had been selected for the Six Sigma treatment (using the DMAIC 
approach (Brue, 2002))  because, i) in the words of one manager:  “it took an 
enormous amount of time, effort and resources and pain to produce the various 
forecasts” and ii) there were concerns about forecast accuracy.  Accurate forecasts 
were regarded as desirable by the logistics managers because they reduced the supply 
chain costs arising from obsolescent products,  inefficient use of warehouse space and 
high inventory levels. In addition, sales targets were closely associated with the 
forecasts and thus affected the bonuses that had to be paid to sales representatives. 
Because of this the forecasting improvement project was regarded as “a big strategic 
project”.  
 
The actors and their interests 
In seeking to identify the actor network which has created the forecasting process we 
chose to distinguish between stakeholders (those who have an interest in the process) 
and actors. Actors not only have an interest in the process, they also have to have the 
ability to influence the process (“to bend space around themselves” (Sidorova and 
Sarka, 2002).  Table 1 lists the actors we identified. 
 
   ** Please insert Table 1 about here** 
. 
We then set about classifying  the interests of the actors that had become apparent 
during our field work, using a method suggested by Vidgen and McMaster (1996).  
This method is based on Mitroff and Linstone’s (1993) multiple perspectives 
approach and considers interests from three perspectives: rational, organisational and  
personal. The rational perspective is concerned with a scientific world view and 
considers actors’ interests from a viewpoint which is objective, logical and rational.  
The organisational perspective considers interests from the perspective of ‘social 
entities, politics and the establishment of shared understandings.’ Finally, the personal 
perspective focuses on individual factors ‘such as power,  influence, prestige, 
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learning, values and experience’. Vidgen and McMaster argue that no single 
perspective will, by itself, be sufficient to gain insights into complex situations . 
Table 2 shows  our interpretation of the actors’ interests using this structure.  
The decision to purchase the forecasting software 
 
This forecasting software had been in use for seven years at the time of the study. It 
was bought ‘off-the-shelf’ (as opposed to being an in-house development), with some 
‘personalised’ settings tailored to the company by the supplier based on an analysis of 
the company’s sales data. At the time of the purchase it was thought that a forecasting 
system was needed “to do the job properly” as one logistics manager explained. 
Before this, individuals had made their own forecasts, often using a ruler to fit a line 
to paper copies of sales graphs. The package was chosen by a group of middle 
managers over two alternatives (including an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
package) with a 9 to 1 vote in its favour. The choice was primarily driven by the 
perceived ‘user-friendliness’ of the package and the marketing and sales people 
commented that they particularly liked the ease with which the forecasts could be 
changed to reflect managerial judgment.  Interestingly, the marketing and sales staff 
took a keen interest in the forecasts for their products, which contrasted with the 
attitude of staff in some other companies visited by the research team. In these other 
companies sales personnel apparently saw their objectives as maintaining customer 
relationships and making deals and, in consequence, had little interest in numbers, 
forecasts and computer packages. 
 
The package was now perceived as being  “fairly extensively used” [in the words of 
one logistics manager], in producing forecasts. Its use was regarded as a big 
improvement on the previous approach and managers felt that forecasting accuracy 
had improved –though no empirical data existed to support this. The package was 
regarded as “the best available” [this quote is from the same logistics manager] and, 
while some users had complaints about particular facilities, most were generally 
satisfied with it. Its perceived central role in the forecasting process was never 
questioned and no one, in the meetings we observed with participants, suggested 




**Insert figure 1 about here** 
 
How the package was used 
 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the company’s forecasting process. Forecasts of 
demand were needed looking forward two months, reflecting the production planning 
requirements of the company’s manufacturers. In theory, the derivation of the 
forecasts involved two main stages. First the forecasters (recall that these were the 
three logistics managers) cleaned the sales history to remove the effects of stockouts 
(these are known from data on orders) so that the series represented the level of 
demand.  They then used the package to produce the ‘base-line’ forecasts (forecasts 
which took no account of market intelligence (MI)). Secondly, these forecasts were 
presented at a forecast review meeting where they were adjusted for MI to produce 
the final forecast.  
As we will show below, the actual practice of producing the forecasts involved some 
blurring of these stages; recent past patterns in the demand were sometimes used as a 
reason for adjustment at review meetings rather than MI (as should have been the case 
if the agreed procedures were being followed)  
A particular difficulty in producing accurate forecasts arose because of the effects of 
cross border trade (CBT) where customers buy the company’s products from overseas 
subsidiaries, usually at a lower price. This resulted in many unforeseen fluctuations in 
the demand data that were used when producing the forecasts. The degree to which 
CBT had impacted on the most recent observations was also difficult to ascertain as it 
took time to obtain information on the level of this activity. Apart from CBT, there 
were many other uncertainties in the market, such as the outcomes of tenders, 
competitors’ actions and consumers’ behaviour. For example, with animal medicines, 
farmers may switch brands when the drug ceases to be effective because bacteria have 
become resistant to its effects.  
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Stage 1 Obtaining the baseline forecasts 
The patterns of the demand history varied according to the product types.  While 
seasonality may have been observed in some animal product series, it was rarely 
found in human product series. More fundamentally, the forecasters explained that 
most products had a life cycle which caused their underlying trend to have a non-
linear shape (see fig 2). In the early years of a product’s life it took time for demand to 
build up as doctors needed to be persuaded to prescribe the drug. Following this, the 
product  experienced a mature phase of demand, before finally losing its patent 
protection. This caused sales to decline as generic products were marketed at a lower 
price.  
**Insert figure 2 about here** 
 
Despite the existence of the product life cycle, the statistical methods embedded in the 
software were designed to extrapolate linear trends. To try to adapt these 
extrapolations, so that they matched the perceived life-cycle pattern, the forecasters 
proceeded as follows.  
 
a) They selected an ‘appropriate’ length of demand history, for a given product so that 
the package generated a trend line that gave the best fit to the selected data, using the 
least squares criterion. Usually two year’s of past data were used, but it could be much 
less (e.g. six months).  The forecasters said that they could not obtain a graphical 
depiction of more than three-year’s demand history, even if they wished to, because of 
a restriction in the software. However, the use of the full two years in developing the 
statistical forecast sometimes delivered forecasts that were deemed implausible. By 
manipulating the length of the demand history, more acceptable forecasts could be 
obtained. The two-month ahead forecasts were then calculated from an extrapolation 
of the trend line. 
 
b)  To further improve the apparent fit of the trend line to the past data and also to 
obtain forecasts that “looked right”, the forecasters often used their judgment to 
override the forecasts obtained in (a). This could be simply achieved by using a mouse 
to reposition the position of the trend line on the graph. Thus the forecasters were 
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ostensibly trying to model the non-linear trends resulting from the perceived product 
life-cycle by fitting and adjusting linear trends to relatively short sequences of past 
data.  
 
Note that senior management had determined that adjustments of forecasts for MI  
market intelligence (see below) had to be reported to them with a documentation of 
their rationale.  However, adjustments to the package’s forecasts like those that we 
have just described did not require documentation and reporting.  There was some 
evidence that at least one product manager was exploiting this loophole. It was in his 
interests for the sales of his product to exceed their forecasts and he therefore tried to 
arrange for his forecasts to be adjusted downwards at the ‘fitting stage’ (his forecaster 
was the placement student) and he subsequently aimed to made few adjustments for 
MI. 
 
Stage 2 Incorporating the effects of market intelligence (MI) 
 
The package’s displays of the forecasts resulting from Stage 1 were presented on a 
large screen at one of 17 monthly product group review meetings. As mentioned 
above, the main purpose of these meetings was officially to allow the forecast to take 
into account market intelligence (MI) The attendees at the forecast review meetings 
were the relevant product manager, whose role was to adjust the forecast for MI, the 
relevant forecaster, who might challenge these adjustments, and representatives of the 
market research, finance and commercial functions. One of the logistics managers 
said “years ago we owned the [forecasting] process;  they [Marketing] owned the 
forecasts”. Since then, senior management had insisted that all parties at the review 
meetings had to jointly own and agree the forecasts.  
 
The review meetings  that were observed differed  in  character. For example, the first 
meeting concerned forecasts for animal products.  Here, the forecasts that were agreed 
were based almost exclusively on the product manager’s intimate knowledge of his 
market. These were never challenged. For example, the manager knew that two large 
customers were ‘repopulating’ and that this would boost the demand for a particular 
drug in two month’s time.  
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A meeting to forecast the demand for a human medicine had a number of contrasting 
characteristics as shown below. 
 
• The meeting was cordial, but there was much debate and participants were 
prepared to challenge each other’s views.  Most of the discussion involved the 
Product Manager and the Logistics Manager. The representatives of the other 
functions had relatively little to say. 
• There was great emphasis on very recent demand history. As stated earlier, the 
forecast initially presented usually were based on, at most, two year’s past data 
because “further back the trends tend to be different”.  The appropriateness of 
this forecast was then assessed by a forensic discussion of very recent demand 
patterns, with particular emphasis on the last three months. An explanation 
was sought for every movement in the graph over these months, though 
reasons for these movements were usually unknown or highly speculative (e.g. 
“Why was October low and November high?” Answer: “I don’t know about 
October. November is normally part of the wholesaler’s build …. We always 
do better in November. Having said that we didn’t last year, did we?” )  
[Quotes are taken directly from tape recordings of the meeting] 
• The baseline forecasts were replaced by new judgmental forecasts, rather than 
being adjusted. (Adjustment would have involved assessing the extent to 
which the baseline forecast need to be changed to reflect MI, rather than the 
estimation of a completely new ‘holistic’ forecast. ) 
• In making the forecasts, the relative demerits of forecasting too low (with the 
risk of stock-out) and forecasting too high (I would have “egg on my face” 
[quote from  Product Manager]) were weighed against one another with the 
stock-out risk being considered the most serious, given the nature of the 
products 
 
The actual forecasting process can thus be summarised as: 
Automatic statistical baseline forecast → Replacement with judgmentally derived 
‘statistical’ baseline forecast → Further judgmental adjustment at Review Meeting to 
obtain final forecast. 
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The accuracy of the judgemental adjustments: a contrasting perspective 
 
The organisational process we have described was always justified by the 
organisational actors as an attempt to improve the accuracy of the forecasting support 
system. If such adjustments have proved consistently helpful, then the conflict 
between the normatively-derived model and the  process merely underlines the 
limitations of the normative model. We can explore aspects of this issue because, 
unlike most decision support systems, the forecasting system described here can be 
unequivocally evaluated as to its effectiveness in delivering accurate forecasts, the 
overt objective of the forecasting process. The three stages in the procedure: 
automatic statistical forecast, ‘judgemental statistical’ forecast, and final market 
adjusted forecast, can each be compared to the sales outcomes. Such a comparison 
gives an alternative perspective on the actors expressed rationale for the various 
interventions they make. 
 
To investigate the extent and effect of judgmental interventions at this stage in the 
process we carried out an analysis of the accuracy of  the sample of 3264 forecasts 
that were supplied by the company. Because the company had no record of the 
original forecasts that would have been generated automatically by their forecasting 
software and because we had restricted access to this software we simulated these 
forecasts by applying the Forecast Pro forecasting system (Stellwagen and Goodrich, 
1994), in automatic mode to 24 consecutive months of past demand data.  Of course, 
there may be some discrepancies between our simulated forecasts and those generated 
by the company’s software. However, we are confident that our simulated forecasts 
provided accurate estimates of the baseline forecasts that the company would have 
obtained had they applied statistical forecasting techniques, without intervention, to 
their data as they are based on a similar algorithm. 
 
The effect of the judgmental adjustment to the automatic forecast can be estimated by 
the difference between the automatic forecasts and the company forecasts. The 
median absolute percentage difference between the automatic (simulated) forecasts 
and the baseline judgemental forecasts used by the company was 10.5% (first quartile: 
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4.6%, third quartile 21.2%).  However, the effort that went into making these 
judgmental interventions in an attempt to improve the baseline forecasts appears to 
have had no effect on the quality of the final forecasts (i.e. the forecasts produced 
after subsequent adjustments for MI). Adjusting a baseline forecast so that it was 
closer to the actual demand was not associated with more accurate final forecasts. For 
example, the bi-serial correlation between the absolute percentage error (APE) of the 
final forecast and whether or not the stage 1 adjustment  led to a baseline forecast  
closer to the actual demand was only -0.006 (it was -0.054 when outliers with 
absolute percentage errors of over 500% were removed). Similarly, the correlation 
between the size of the adjustment to the automatic forecast (measured as an absolute 




62.3% of the sampled ‘statistical’  baseline forecasts were judgmentally adjusted, 
ostensibly for MI . Did  these adjustments lead to improved accuracy? Analysis of the 
sample indicated that moderate improvements were sometimes achieved:  the median 
absolute percentage error of the baseline forecasts was 17.3%, while that of the 
adjusted forecasts was 14.3%. However, only 51.3% of forecasts were improved 
through MI adjustment and the  most successful adjustments tended to be larger.  
Table 1 shows, for the forecasts that were adjusted, the size of the intervention and 
whether it improved  accuracy. Less than 45% of the smallest adjustments (below the 
first quartile) improved  accuracy while  over 58% of the largest adjustments (above 
the third quartile) resulted in improvements. This suggests that the smaller 
adjustments  (and many of the larger ones) involved further tinkering with the 
baseline forecasts, possibly because  the forecasters perceived patterns in recent noise. 
It seems unlikely that such adjustments would be made  because the members of the 
review meeting were in possession of important MI which was likely to have a major 
effect on demand. 
 




Summary: The Organisation’s Forecasting Process 
 
The organisation’s forecasters devoted much judgmental effort  to establishing the 
baseline forecasts. As the statistical analysis shows, automatic forecasts from the 
software would apparently have served them just as well. These refitted  baseline 
forecasts were then often  changed again at the meetings, leading to only moderate 
gains in accuracy in some cases, but reductions in accuracy on nearly half of 
occasions.  ‘Optimised’ statistical forecasts, based on long demand  histories thus had 
virtually no role at all. How did managers perceive the quality of their forecasting 
process? The perception of one of the logistics managers was that they were “good on 
reporting error levels, but not good on using the data that they have to improve 
forecast accuracy” (e.g. stock level data that were available for some customers were 
not used.). In particular,  this manager thought that there was potential for improving 
their ability to learn from past forecast errors. However, managers saw little need for 





Formation of the actor-network 
 
The forecasting process we have observed is viewed as satisfactory despite pressures 
for improvement, through for example, the six sigma initiative. For the purpose of 
understanding the networked forces that create stability, it is useful to start with the 
perspective of a single actor who has an interest in changing the status quo. This actor 
will be referred to as the ‘focal actor’ and we will aim to  show how other actors’ 
alignment with the focal actor’s interests leads to the formation of the network 
(Sidorova and Sarka, 2002) through a process of enrolment.  In our case, we will 
designate the software vendor as the focal actor, though we could have taken the 
perspective of another actor as our starting point and we would still have derived the 
same rationale for the formation of the network. 
 
The vendor is interested in obtaining sales of the package. This interest is served by 
advertising the accuracy and sophistication of the package’s inbuilt statistical methods 
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and its facilities for judgmental intervention, together with the package’s ease of use 
(evidence for the highlighting of these attributes can be found on the software 
company’s web site).  The vendor will also want to maximise the profit on the sale. 
This will be achieved by selling a package containing a standard (rather than a 
customised) set of statistical forecasting methods in order to spread the package’s 
development costs . In the words of one software developer: “We live in a  
commercial reality, you see, and the customer will come along and say I would like 
something [ a new facility] and you say I can’t do this unless you co-fund  the 
development” [this quote has been slightly re-worded to improve clarity]. Inscription 
of the software with easy-to-use facilities for judgmental intervention will thus serve 
the vendor’s interests in a second way because it will effectively place the costs of any 
local adaptation (or customisation) of the forecasts upon the user. This will also 
reduce the chances of the software being blamed for forecast errors, so ensuring 
continued use. Continued use is in the vendor’s interests because users will pay for the 
maintenance of the package and will attend user conferences and purchase upgrades. 
Also, the existence of an active body of existing users is likely to attract new 
customers. 
 
However, the provision of  an easy-to-use facility for judgmental intervention is also 
in the interests of the company’s middle managers. They can be seen to be using an 
advanced package containing reportedly sophisticated and accurate statistical 
methods, while at the same time being able easily to control the forecasts. The 
existence of these facilities for intervention has been particularly useful in the 
enrolment of the product managers whose participation in forecasting is seen as 
crucial because of their market intelligence. It allows them to derive prestige by 
demonstrating their expertise on their markets at forecast review meetings and gives 
them the opportunity of attempting  to push the forecasts in directions that suit the 
balance of their interests. For example one product manager, commenting on the 
software, said:  “It’s there, it’s useful, but it needs to be managed since no way can it 
have the market intelligence”.  
  
Despite their limitations from a statistical point of view, the linearity of the package’s 
extrapolations is actually an asset in securing its acceptance. It provides a pretext for 
interventions, allowing users to make adjustments for other reasons. To maintain their 
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own standing, the logistics managers need to produce baseline forecasts which look 
credible at review meetings where colleagues have an intolerance of noise in the time 
series.  To achieve this they can use the intervention facilities to fit and refit past 
trends to different lengths of past history until a close fitting trend is achieved. One 
logistics manager described the package as being “quite good” because it allowed the 
graphical fit of the trend line to be easily assessed  as  judgmental changes were made 
to it and the length of the demand history. 
 
It is in senior managers’ interests to receive timely forecasts that they perceive to be 
from an advanced, modern forecasting process yielding baseline forecasts that are as 
accurate as possible, given current technology.  It is also in their interests to ensure the 
inclusion of all relevant middle managers in the process. The package serves these 
interests because, when coupled with a projector, it produces graphical and tabular 
displays that can be used in review meetings involving groups of managers and allows 
forecasts to be easily and publicly changed during these meetings. The old ‘ruler and 
paper’ system would not be compatible with such meetings. Senior Managers also 
want to be able to exercise some control and monitoring of  this process. From their 
perspective the package also has a facility which allows for adjustment for market 
intelligence (in computing terms this is actually no different from the baseline 
adjustment) and, by requiring documentation of these adjustments, they perceive that 
control over the process can be exercised. Also, in relation to total turnover, the cost 




How stable is the actor-network? Any proposal to replace the existing package with 
an alternative would probably be resisted by all of the actors. To the middle managers 
it would involve the risk of losing the benefits of control over the forecasts, disruption 
and (in the case of the logistics managers) the need to learn a new package. For the 
senior managers changing to another package would involve purchasing and other 
costs, disruption and probably resistance from middle managers. All of this has served 
to consolidate the alignment of interests of the vendor and middle and senior 
managers and helped to ensure the irreversibility of the network. Although managers 
indicated that they felt their forecast’s accuracy could be improved (this was part of 
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their main motive for inviting us into the company) they evidently wished to make 
these improvements within the existing structure. A suggestion by one the researchers 
at the end of the interviews that the company might be using inappropriate software, 
and that what was needed was a model that supported extrapolations based on product 
life cycles, was received sceptically. It was apparent that the company would like to 
find ways of making better use of available information in order to improve the 
quality of their judgmental interventions –the role of the forecasting package would 
remain unchanged.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this case study we observed a company whose managers perceived that they were 
making extensive use of an advanced statistical forecasting package and who were 
generally satisfied with the package.  Yet the essential features of the package  -its 
statistical methods which produced linear extrapolations -were not congruent with the 
company’s perceived forecasting task and they were, in reality, not employed at all. 
Moreover, the main facility that was used, its graphical data display, was limited both 
in the clarity of its presentation and in the length of history it could handle.  From the 
technological imperative perspective, where people make rational economic decisions 
and make optimal use of appropriate technology, this situation is inexplicable. 
However, from the perspective of actor-network theory, where actors form alliances 
of interests, the decision to purchase and continue to use the package becomes 
understandable. 
 
The perception that the package was extensively used was a socially constructed  
reality. Repeated patterns of use over seven years had become  institutionalised  and 
reified (Orlikowski, 1992) so that nobody now questioned the role of the package. 
Actors perceptions of their interests will have been shaped by this socially constructed 
reality. For example, the belief that the package ‘was the best available’ will have 
precluded senior management and other actors from evaluating alternatives. 
 
Our understanding, as researchers, of the role of forecasting packages in supply chain 
companies has been enhanced as a result of this study. This enhancement has 
progressed though a series of iterations known as the hermeneutical circle (Klein and 
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Myers, 1999) which has involved explaining apparently  anomalous situations by 
cross-referencing  them to situations that did ‘make sense’ in a manner analogous to 
the interpretation of an ancient text.  As stated earlier, our belief at the outset was that 
forecasting accuracy in companies like this could be improved though the provision of 
well designed software that contained appropriate statistical methods and features to 
support the effective use of management judgment. We still adhere to the core of this 
belief, but now recognise that, on its own,   it is too narrow a view and that the design 
of software needs to take account of the network of interests of actors associated with 
it.  Well designed software will not be written and used unless it serves the aligned 
interests of vendors, users, senior managers and others to form new and irreversible 
actor-networks. Yet poorly, or inappropriately, designed software will ‘succeed’ if it 
does serve these interests. 
 
Adopting for the moment the normative perspective with which we started, it is 
tempting to suggest that the pharmaceutical company’s forecasting process could be 
reconfigured to the benefit of the company, if the actors’ interests could be re-aligned. 
Such changes might result if external threats or opportunities present themselves, such 
as the arrival of new personnel who promote the adoption of new ERP software or an 
influential six sigma campaign (Fildes and Hastings, 1995).  However, we recognise 
that this itself might be a simplification and an intrusion of a technological imperative 
view into our thinking.  
 
Of course, as a result of such patterns in our thinking, and our position as outsiders, 
we may never be able to gain a complete understanding of an organization like this 
and the behaviour of its members. For example, we cannot be sure that the tone and 
orientation of the semi-structured interviews that we conducted was not, at least 
unconsciously influenced by our preconceptions and beliefs . Similarly, our presence 
at review meetings, where we may have been regarded as forecasting experts, may 
have influenced the processes that took place, despite our attempts to act only as 
silent, non-judgmental observers.   As far as possible, we tried to implement the 
‘principle of suspicion’ in case people were simply presenting an ‘official company 
view’ or a view that was designed to impress us. (Klein and Myers, 1999). We were 
helped in this by the presence of the placement student. As a ‘relative outsider’, who 
had nevertheless already worked in the company for nine months, he was able to 
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provide an alternative perspective during his interview. Nevertheless, Myers (1997) 
has argued that no final interpretation is ever achieved, since each interpretation may 
itself be subject to critical reflection. Our objective was to achieve at least an 
improved understanding of the use of forecasting software, explaining through case 
analysis, what has often proved a conundrum to forecasting researchers with a 
primarily statistical orientation:  why what is normatively viewed as ‘best practice’ 
fails to be adopted in organisations that express a commitment to improved accuracy.  
 
This research poses a stark question to software designers and academic forecasters; 
how the organisational and personal barriers embodied in the actor-network can be 
overcome to achieve more cost-effective forecasts and useful software. The heavy 
reliance in organisations like this on actors’ interventions makes such an outcome 
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Forecasters clean sales  history (e.g. 
for stock-outs) and prepare forecasts 
in forecasting package 
Review meeting – product manager, forecaster, finance and 
marketing research personnel 
Product manager adds market intelligence to the forecasts, 








Figure 1 The company’s forecasting process 
 
The final forecasts are sent to the plant system so that 
they can plan the production schedule 
The final forecasts are sent to 
SAP (SAP R3) from the 
forecasting package 
The forecasts are emailed to 
the unit head 
In the third week of the month, the 
board reviews and agrees on the 
major market intelligence 
adjustments and the forecasts 
The information sent to , the Europe-wide 
forecasting system, where the stock level in 
relation to inventory target is monitored. 
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Percentages Size of adjustment
Effect in forecast 
accuracy










Reduced accuracy 55.01 52.95 44.88 41.85
Improved accuracy 44.99 47.05 55.12 58.15




Table 1 Size of adjustment to baseline forecast and effect on final forecast accuracy
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   Interests  
Actors Rational Organisational Individual
Senior managers* Ensure forecasts are received 
which are useful for monitoring 
business and supporting plans 
and decisions i.e. forecasts which 
are accurate, timely, cost-
effective and complete. 
Exercise control over forecasting process. Ensure 
forecasting are seen to be using 'modern' methods. Ensure 
all relevant people are involved in forecasting. Minimise 
chances of conflict between middle managers. Retain 
existing software to avoid disruption through change 
  
  Ensure forecasts minimise  
chances of stockouts without 
excessive safety stocks Balance 
purchase cost of software and 




Marketing & Product 
managers 
Achieve high sales and high 
quality of service to customers -
minimise chances of stock outs 
Ensure forecasts are high enough to minimise chances of 
stockouts. Maintain some control over forecasts. 
Understand limitations of baseline forecasts 
Demonstrate expertise relating to 
product.Maximise sales commission 
Maintain good personal relationships with 
customers. Make sure forecasts are not 
too high as they  will look good if they 
exceed forecasts. Adjust forecasts without 
documentation of rationale. Avoid being 
seen to manipulate forecasts in one's own 
interests. Avoid large forecast errors -
given joint responsibility. Be associated 
with  introduction of system that will 
impress senior managers. 
Accountants Minimise costs resulting from 
forecast errors 
Minimise inventory costs 
Counter Product Managers  when they push for higher 
forecasts & more safety stocks, but  still minimise chances 
of stockout. Have some control over forecasts 
Avoid large forecast errors -given joint 
responsibility 
 




Table 2: An Analysis of the Actors’ Interests (continued) 
  
  
  Interests 
  
Actors    Rational Organisational Individual
Logistics managers who 
produce 'baseline 
forecasts 
Produce accurate forecasts Counter conflicting tendencies of Product managers and 
accountants for over and under forecasting.  Be seen to be 
making forecast in professional manner by using an 
advanced software package. Keep Product Managers on 
board as their MI is crucial for forecast accuracy. 
Share responsibility for significant forecast 
errors. Minimise work involved in 
producing base line forecasts by having 
easy to use software. Maintain image of 
competence by producing 'baseline'  
forecasts that look intutively reasonable at 
review meetings. Avoid significant conflict 
at review meetings. Demonstrate 
expertise in use of software. Maintain 
control over forecasts given responsibility. 
Minimise documentation of forecasts' 
rationale. .Stay with current package to 
minimise changeover costs and effort..Be 
associated with a system that will impress 
senior managers. 
Software vendors* Maximise profit derived from 
sales and support of forecasting 
software, Employ robust 
forecasting methods capable of 
widespread use across many 
companies and industries -rather 
than industry specific methods. 
 
Maintain loyalty of customers 
through user conferences 
Advertise accuracy and sophistication of software's 
statistical methods but  provide facilities for judgmental  
overrides. Ensure that software is easy to use. Allow easy 
use by non-forecasting experts. Ensure continued 
customer loyalty. Minimise costs of writing and providing 
software 
Maximise sales. Avoid responsibility for 
any forecast inaccuracy 
The software* Maximise reputation  and number 
of users 
Ensure continued use. Maximise user satisfaction and 
ease of use. Provide displays capable of being used in 
meetings. Maximise analytical power and flexiblity of 
software. Outshine rivals 
  
 
